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DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUITONAL LAw-Self Incrimination-The fifth amendment, in
its direct application to the federal government and its bearing on the
states by reason of the fourteenth amendment, forbids either comment
by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court
that such silence is evidence of guilt.
Griffin v. State of California, 85 Sup. Ct. 1229 (1965).
The fifth amendment contains a number of provisions for the protection
of persons accused of crimes. One of the more important protections is
found in the clause that "no person . .. shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself."' Of the fifty states' statutes, forty-
four prohibit any comment on an accused's failure to testify in his own
behalf as "an unwarrantable line of argument."2 Six states permit com-
ment and two of these six do so by explicit constitutional qualification
of the privilege against self-incrimination. California is such a state:
.. in any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not,
his failure to explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence
or facts in the case against him may be commented upon by the
court and by counsel, and may be considered by the court or the
jury.3
The constitutionality of this section of the California Constitution became
the central issue in Griffin v. California.'
One Eddie Dean Griffin was convicted of murder in the first degree
after a jury trial in which he chose not to testify. Both the prosecutor
and the trial court, relying upon Article One of the California Constitu-
tion, commented upon Griffin's failure to testify and deny or explain
evidence which the court contended was "within his personal knowledge."
In his closing argument the prosecutor said, "These things he [Defen-
dant] has not seen fit to take the stand and deny or explain." 5 The trial
judge instructed the jury that a presumption of guilt could not be inferred
from defendant's failure to testify; however failure to explain or deny
"facts within defendant's personal knowledge" could be the basis for
unfavorable inferences by the jury as to those facts. Griffin's conviction
was affirmed by the California Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Had the Griffin case been a federal trial, the comments by prosecutor
and court would have constituted reversible error on the basis of a
1. U. S. Const. amend. V.
2. State v. Howard, 35 Sup. Ct. 197 (1892).
3. Cal. Const. art. I, § 13.
4. 85 Sup. Ct. 1229 (1965).
S. The prosecutor made other statements, all of which consistently attacked the accused's
position not to testify. See prosecutor's argument quoted in the Court's opinion, Id. at 1231.
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federal statute.6 However, since this was a state case the inquiry re-
mained as to whether the California comment rule in its state constitu-
tion violated the fifth amendment of the Federal Constitution.
Discussing the congressional act, cited in Wilson v. United States,
7
the Griffin Court gave numerous reasons why an innocent person would
choose not to testify in his own behalf. The Court said that timidity or
extreme nervousness could be the principal reasons why "it is not every
one, however honest, who would therefore willingly be placed on the
witness stand."8
Prior to the Griffin decision, the fifth amendment's self-incrimination
clause had been held applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment in Malloy v. Hogan,' where the Court held that "the same
standards must determine whether an accused's silence in either a federal
or state proceeding is justified."' 0
By synthesizing the federal standard exemplified in Wilson and the
Court's final determination in Malloy, one is led to the inescapable con-
clusion reached in Griffin. In.reversing the California conviction, Justice
Douglas wrote,
We take that [Malloy v. Hogan] in its literal sense and hold
that the Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to the federal
government and its bearing on the States by reason of the Four-
teenth Amendment, forbids either comment by the prosecution
on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such
silence is evidence of guilt."
California attempted to support its position on its comment rule'"
by insisting that the inference of guilt "naturally and irresistibly" at-
taches when an accused fails to testify as to facts within his personal
knowledge. The Court met this argument squarely as it said, "What the
jury may infer given no help from the court is one thing. What they may
infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused . . . is quite
another."'"
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1948). The original statute was cited in Wilson v. United States,
149 U.S. 60 (1893) and then revised in1948.
7. Ibid.
8. See discussion of 18 U.S.C. § 3481 in Wilson v. United States, supra note 6; and
Griffin v. California, supra note 4, at 1234.
•9. 84 S. Ct. 1495 (1964). This case was decided by the Federal Supreme Court after
the California Supreme Court had already decided and affirmed the Griffin conviction.
10. Ibid.
11. Griffin v. California, supra note 4, at 1233.
12. People v. Modesto, 42 Cal. 417, 398 P.2d 753 (1965). The California Supreme Court
stated that its "comment" rule squared with Malloy v. Hogan, supra note 9.
13. Griffin v. California, supra note 4.
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From its own rigid prohibition in Wilson, to its application of the
self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment to the States in Malloy,
the Court in Griffin by closing the circle has imposed the federal stan-
dard upon the States; for the procedural self-incrimination clause must
not only be "a matter of local concern."1
The concept of prohibiting self-incrimination grew out of the pro-
tests against the inquisitorial methods of the English ecclesiastical
courts and the Court of Star Chamber, which tortured persons accused
of heresy or treason to obtain confessions. By the latter half of the
seventeenth century the privilege was well-established in English law
and subsequently adopted in the United States.15 Proponents of the
comment rule point to this history and argue that the self-incrimination
clause of the fifth amendment has outlived its usefulness, for the coercive
methods it sought to exterminate are no longer a part of reality. They
contend, as the dissent in Griffin does, that ". . . the lurid realities which
lay behind enactment of the Fifth Amendment, [are] a far cry from the
subject matter of the case before us."' 6 It is submitted, however, that
the Griffin Court, completely cognizant of the far reaching implications
of so subtle a procedural device as the "comment rule," contributed
much to the safeguard of such a fundamental protection as the Constitu-
tion, through the fifth amendment, accords to those accused of crimes.
It is a certainty that the Supreme Court will continue, as it did in Griffin,
to condemn any practice, however slight, of imputing sinister meaning
to the exercise of a person's constitutional right under the fifth amend-
ment.' 7
Frank Intrieri
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-Right to Travel-Area Restrictions-Congres-
sional intent of Passport Act of 1926 and Immigration & Nationality Act
of 1952.
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 85 Sup. Ct. 1271 (1965).
On March 31, 1962, plaintiff, a Connecticut ski-resort operator, applied
by letter to the Director of the Passport Office for permission to have
his passport validated for travel to Cuba as a tourist. This request was
denied with the explanation that only persons whose travel might be in
the best interests of the United States, such as newsmen and business-
men with previously established interest, could travel to Cuba, and that
14. See dissenting opinion, Id. at 1237.
15. 1 Tresolini, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 548 (1959).
16. See dissenting opinion, Griffin v. California, supra note 4, at 1236.
17. Self Incrimination and the Duty to Testify, 16 JOURNAL OF POLITICS 509 (1954).
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